Monetary policy in Europe vs the US: what explains the difference? by Uhlig, Harald
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Monetary policy in Europe vs the US:
what explains the difference?
Harald Uhlig
Dept. of Economics, University of Chicago
26. July 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14119/
MPRA Paper No. 14119, posted 18. March 2009 07:10 UTC
Monetary policy in Europe vs the US: what
explains the difference?∗
Harald Uhlig
University of Chicago
Deutsche Bundesbank, CentER and CEPR
PRELMINARY
COMMENTS WELCOME
First draft: May 1st, 2007
This revision: July 26, 2007
∗Address: Prof. Harald Uhlig, The University of Chicago, Department of Economics,
1126 East 59th Street, Chicago IL 60637, USA. e-mail: huhlig@uchicago.edu. This re-
search was started when the author was professor at Humboldt Universita¨t zu Berlin and
there supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 “Economic
Risk”. I am grateful to Andreas Hornstein for a very useful conversation, to Andy Levin
for an excellent discussion and for pointing out an algebraic mistake (now corrected). I am
grateful to participants at the Barcelona meeting for many additionally useful remarks. I
apologize that I must keep most of these excellent comments and appropriate criticisms
as inspiration for future work.
Abstract
This paper compares monetary policy in the US and EMU during
the last decade, employing an estimated hybrid New Keynesian cash-
in-advance model, driven by five shocks. It appears that the difference
between the two monetary policies between 1998 and 2006 is due to
both surprises in productivity as well as surprises in wage demands,
moving interest rates in opposite directions in Europe and the US, but
not due to a more sluggish response in Europe to the same shocks or
to different monetary policy surprises.
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1 Introduction
Interest rate paths during the last decade or so have been remarkably different
in the US and in Europe, see figure 1. What explains the difference?
The analysis of this paper leads to the conclusion, that the difference is
due to surprises in productivity as well as surprises in wage demands, moving
interest rates in opposite directions in Europe and the US, but not due to a
more sluggish response in Europe to the same shocks or to different monetary
policy surprises. To obtain these conclusions, I have specified and estimated
a hybrid New Keynesian DSGE model and have used it to investigate three
potential interpretations for the US-EMU difference.
The first interpretation is to argue that monetary policy is simply differ-
ent. A number of observers have argued that the difference in policy shows
the difference between an established central bank in the US, which knows
what it is doing and acts decisively, if need be, versus a new central bank in
Europe, run by a committee which is too timid and too inertial to anything
in time, following the US example with too much caution and delay. A more
benign interpretation - recently put forth e.g. by ECB president Trichet in
a speech on “Activism and alertness in monetary policy” in Madrid 2006 -
argues that instead it is the ECB holding the steering wheel steady, while
the monetary policy pursued by the Fed is just erratic.
The second interpretation is that the shocks simply have been different.
For example, growth in the US was considerably higher in the second half
of the 90s in the US, giving rise to fear of “overheating” there and thereby
possibly necessitating policy interventions, which then needed to be reversed,
as the US economy spun into a recession. While the decline in growth rates
in EMU may have been similarly large between 2000 and 2002, the growth
rate only briefly achieved US levels in 2000, though, see figure 2.
The third interpretation is that the structure of the economies are simply
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Figure 1: Central bank rates in the EMU and in the US.
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Figure 2: Real GDP growth in the US and EMU.
2
different. There are three striking differences in particular:
1. Labor markets are more rigid in Europe than in the US. While one
can point to some measures, the evidence here comes more from a va-
riety of sources and qualitative measures, starting with labor market
regulations and government interference in the labor market to union
memberships and the role of unions in economic policy and the gover-
nance of firms.
2. The share of government is larger in Europe than it is in the US. For
the period from 1985 to 2005, mean government consumption to GDP
was 16 percent in the US and 20 percent in the US. For government
expenditure, the contrast was even more striking, with 32 percent in
the US versus 50 percent in Europe, see also figure 3. Furthermore,
fiscal policy is arguably more decentralized in Europe, with Brussels
playing a minor role vis-a-vis the nation states in Europe compared to
the federal government vis-a-vis state and local governments in the US.
3. A much larger share of business is bank-financed rather than market
financed in EMU, compared to the US. For example, de Fiore and Uhlig
(2006) document that the ratio of debt-to-equity is .41 in the US and
.61 in Europe. Furthermore, the ratio of bank-to-bond finance is 7.3 in
the EMU and thus ten times as high as 0.74, the value for the US.
It seems a priori plausible that these differences play a significant factor in the
explanations for monetary policy. For example, government spending tends
to be rather smooth and acyclical: a larger share of government spending
might therefore lessen the role of price rigidities for the private economy.
Recent advances in the modelling of dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium models - e.g. Smets and Wouters (2003), Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans (2005) and related work - in particular have made it possible in
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Figure 3: Government consumption and government expenditure
principle to impose the key structural differences of the economy, estimate
monetary policy reaction functions and quantitatively account for the move-
ments in key variables by a decomposition into the model-specific structural
shocks. This avenue is therefore well-suited for answering the question at
hand.
These models are built on recent advances in investigating the role of
sticky prices for the economy and the New Keynesian paradigm, see in par-
ticular Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003). Applying
them directly to the task at hand poses three challenges, however.
1. Most of these models emphasize the role of sticky prices and the output
gap in driving inflation rates. Frictions from the interaction between
financial intermediation and monetary policy typically play no role or
a role only insofar as they influence the output gap. This makes it
challenging to address the third of the three key differences above.
2. The distortionary role of non-monetary economic policy typically plays
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a minor role. This makes it hard to address the first the second of the
key differences listed above.
3. In quantitative applications and estimations, many observable time se-
ries are used. An equivalent number of shocks is then used in order to
generate a regular one-step ahead variance-covariance matrix of the pre-
diction errors. This makes it challenging to avoid pushing key dynamic
features of the economy into “measurement errors” instead, which then
receive a structural interpretation.
There is an earlier literature, emphasizing financial frictions and the real-
locational role of monetary injections. For example, Lucas and Stokey (1987)
emphasize the role of cash for some of the transactions, while Bernanke-
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) emphasize credit contracts arising in the pres-
ence of asymmetric information. While the New Keynesian approach in
focussing on sticky prices may be appealing for a number of reasons, it is
useful for the task at hand to bring lessons of that earlier literature into this
framework.
There are important contributions in the literature on which I can draw
for this task. In their seminal paper, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(2005) or CEE impose a cash-in-advance constraint for firms to pay their
wage bill. Firms borrow these funds from financial intermediaries who in turn
obtain funds from household deposits as well as central bank cash injection.
While this feature of their paper seems there mostly to create some sort of
money demand, it opens the possibility of studying financial frictions further.
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Linde (2004) assume an additional cost for purchasing consumption goods,
which depends on the velocity of the household’s cash balances. Christiano,
Motto and Rostagno (2003) introduce a fairly rich banking sector, allowing
for various monetary aggregates such as bank reserves and demand deposits,
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to study the role of money in the Great Depression.
To keep the model tractable, yet allow for some potentially important
avenues, I largely follow the lead of CEE. I additionally allow for a cash-
in-advance constraint on consumption good purchases in order to judge the
relative importance of private transactions to firm borrowing. I allow for the
possibility that not all cash-injections are permanent, but instead are taken
out of the system again at the end of the period (which one might think
of a one-off reverse transaction). Finally, I explicitely account for the cost
of borrowing in the profit maximization problem and price setting problem
of the firm, giving rise to an interest-rate cost channel, see also Barth and
Ramey (2001), Gaiotti and Secchi (2006). This is a modest contribution to
solving the first of the three challenges listed above.
I will explicitely allow for distortionary taxation of labor income, used
to finance a stock of government as well as a certain level of government
expenditure. I view this as a beginning to make progress on the second
challenge above. Certainly, several - although not all - monetary policy
models of recent vintage have allowed for such influence of nonmonetary
policy: this model is in the same tradition. In particular, Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2006) add distortionary income taxation to CEE.
For the third challenge, I use DYNARE and thus off-the-shelve estima-
tion techniques, and discuss some issues arising from mapping the dynamics
into the dynamics for few observable series only, employing the “ABCD”-
framework of Fernandez-Villaverde et al (2007). In particular, I will focus on
a small set of observable variable, judiciously chosen, and allow for as many
shocks as there are variables. It will turn out that one needs to be careful.
It is not just enough to insure an invertible mapping from the shocks to the
innovations of the variables, but furthermore, it is important to check invert-
ibility of the VAR representation itself. We do this by “visually” inspecting
the VAR coefficients in the derived representation, see section 4.
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In sum, the model can perhaps best be described as a variant of the CEE
model, with the following deviations:
1. The costs of adjusting the capital stock arise from the investment-to-
capital ratio, not the investment-to-previous-investment ratio.
2. There is a cash-in-advance constraint for household consumption pur-
chases.
3. Only a fraction of the cash injections, which “liquify” the loan market
for firms, may permanently increase the money supply.
4. The interest rate costs for borrowing part of the input bill explicitly
arises in the objective function of the intermediate good firms.
5. Capital utilization is constant.
6. There is a distortionary tax on wage income and firm profits. There is
government debt.
7. There is no indexation.
8. There is real wage sluggishness, following Blanchard and Gali (2005).
9. Monetary policy is assumed to follow a Taylor rule.
10. There are six shocks: a productivity shock, an investment-specific
shock, a wage setting shock, a monetary policy shock and two fiscal
policy shocks, a tax rate shock and a spending shock. For estimation,
I only “turn on” the tax rate shock.
11. Estimation is in terms of five variables, inverting for the shocks per the
recursive law of motion.
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The approach of this paper as well as the results share many similarities
with the two slightly earlier papers by Jean-Guillaume Sahuc and Frank
Smets (2006) as well as Lawrence Christiano, Roberto Motto and Massimo
Rostagno (2007).
Sahuc and Smets (2006) likewise come to the “overall conclusion ... that
differences in the size and the persistence of the shocks hitting the two
economies is the main driving force behind the different interest rate be-
haviour.” Their model differs from mine in several dimensions. Most notably
perhaps, there is no role for fiscal policy and hardly a role for differences in
the financial structure in their paper.
Christiano et al (2007) also share the view with this paper that “the US
economy was aided during the most severe pahse of the [2001] recession by
favourable productivity shocks, which ... helped keep inflation in check. By
contrast, the slowdown in the Euro Area was exacerbated by negative pro-
ductitivity forces which also prevented inflation from ebbing.” These authors
furthermore emphasize the greater persistence of ECB policy compared to
Fed policy. This is in some contrast to our findings: while e.g. monetary
policy shocks are more persistent in the EMU that the US according to our
findings, interest rates are not.
The model by Christiano et al (2007) features a much more detailed
entrepreneurial sector as well as more details on the banking sector, and
therefore makes more progress than this paper in its ability to address the
differences in financial structure between the US and Europe. There is no role
for fiscal policy in their paper, though. Their model is driven by 15 shocks,
whereas my model features only five. The costs of adjusting capital in their
model is determined by the change in investment, whereas it is determined
(more classically) by the ratio of investment to capital here.
These two papers therefore complement the investigation here. Despite
a number of modelling differences they come to fairly similar conclusions,
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which ought to provide additional trust in the conclusions drawn.
Section 2 explains the model. A technical appendix provides the details
for the analysis of the model. Section 3 explains the estimation strategy
and lists the parameters used for the comparison. Section 4 is devoted to
the invertibility issue. Section 5 provides results. Section 6 discusses these
results and offers some tentative conclusions.
2 The model
The model is a combination of a cash-in-advance model and a Calvo sticky-
price model, amended with a role for a government.
Time is discrete. There are identical households, who supply labor and
enjoy final consumption. They own all firms. They use cash for parts of their
transactions. There is a competitive sector of final-goods producing firms.
There is a unit interval of monopolistic intermediate-good firms, using labor
to produce output and setting sticky prices. They need to borrow a fraction
of their input bill from commercial banks. Commercial banks take deposits
from households and receive cash injections from the central bank. They lend
to intermediate-goods firms. The central bank injects cash and thereby sets
the nominal interest rate. The government taxes wage income and uses it to
finance government purchases as well as debt repayments. Nominal wages
are sluggish on the aggregate level.
A period has four parts:
1. Shocks are realized. The new nominal wage for the period is set. The
central bank injects cash Ψt to banks.
2. A fraction of intermediate good firms is chosen to reset its price. In-
termediate good firms “guess” demand and produce accordingly, hiring
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labor at the market wage. They are assumed to be required to borrow
a fixed fraction of the input bill from banks.
3. Households shop, using cash at hand as well. Government shops, using
tax receipts as well as a short-term credit line from the central bank.
4. Financial markets open. Firms pay capital rental payments and wages
to households. Firms pay interest to banks. They pay profits to house-
holds. Households pay taxes to the government. The government issues
new bonds and repays old bonds. The household splits the remaining
cash into deposits with banks and cash-at-hand for the next period.
2.1 Households
Household enjoy final consumption ct and dislike labor nt according to
U = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
log(ct − χct−1)− An1+σt
)]
(1)
where 0 ≤ χ < 1 is a habit parameter and 1/σ > 0 is the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply. Households enter period t, holding deposits Dt−1 at financial
intermediaries and cash-at-hand Ht−1. In the second part of the period, they
supply labor nt according to demand at the market wage Wt. In the third
part, they use cash-at-hand to shop for a fraction η of consumption,
Ht,res + ηPtct = Ht−1 (2)
holding residual cash Ht,res ≥ 0. I essentially assume that there are cash
goods and credit goods as in Lucas-Stokey (1987), but that these cash and
credit goods are purchased in fixed proportion for consumption, and that
investment goods are always credit goods1. The latter would be implied by
1A key reason for introducing the cash-in-advance constraint on only a fraction of
the goods is that otherwise the money stock becomes quantitatively large in this model,
implying that seignorage is a substantial fraction of the government budget constraint.
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a Leontieff specification for the preferences in cash and credit goods. In
principle, the household may spend less cash than available. However, I shall
assume that shocks and parameters are such, that the constraint on residual
cash is binding, Ht,res = 0.
In the forth part of the period, households receive after-tax nominal wages
and trade all contingent claims as well as firm shares and government bonds,
and pay for the remaining (1− η) share of their purchases (“credit goods”).
Netting out all household-to-household trades, the financial market budget
constraint is
Ht +Dt + qtBt + (1− η)Ptct + Ptxt (3)
= (1− τt)Wtnt + (1 + it)Dt−1
+PtrtKt−1 + (1− τV )Vt +Bt−1 +Ht,res
where Ht is cash-at-hand for the next period, Dt is deposited with banks, qt
is the discount price for government bonds Bt, 1 + it is the return paid by
banks on deposits Dt−1, Ptrt is the nominal rental rate for capital, Vt is the
value added of intermediate good firms, and Bt−1 are the debt repayments
by the government.
One can extend this budget constraint with between-household trades.
In particular, let Λt,t+k be the discount price on the financial market at t for
an extra unit of cash on the financial market at date t+ k.
Also, households produce new capital subject according to
kt =
(
1− δ + ϕ
(
(1 + ux,t)
xt
kt−1
))
kt−1 (4)
where the adjustment cost function ϕ(·) satisfies
ϕ(δ) = δ, ϕ′(δ) = 1, δϕ′′(δ) = − 1
$
for some $ > 0, see Jermann (1998), and where ux,t is a possibly persistent
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investment-specific disturbance,
ux,t = ρxux,t−1 + ²x,t. (5)
following Fisher (2006).
2.2 Final good firms
Final good firms take inputs yt,j to produce a final good yt according to the
production function
yt =
(∫ 1
0
y
1/(1+µ)
t,j dj
)1+µ
(6)
They purchase intermediate goods at price Pt,i per unit and sell the final
good at price Pt.
2.3 Intermediate good firms
Given a current intermediate goods price Pt,j, intermediate good firms “guess”
their demand yt,j resulting from the demand of final good firms, see equation
(62). They thus hire labor nt,j at nominal wages Wt and rent capital kt,j at
nominal rental rates Ptrt to produce output according to
yt,j =
 γtk
θ
t,jn
1−θ
t,j − Φ if γtnt,j > Φ
0 otherwise
(7)
where γt is an exogenous process for the change in technology and Φ is a
parameter of the production function and might be thought of as a fixed cost
of production. Let γˆt = log(γt)− log(γ¯) for some appropriate γ¯, and assume
γˆt = ργ,Lγˆt−1 + uγ,t (8)
uγ,t = ργ,uuγ,t−1 + ²γ,t
I assume that the firm needs to obtain a loan Lt,j for a fraction ξt of
the input bill, on which a nominal market interest rate it needs to be paid.
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The rest of the input bill is paid for per trade credit (or more efficient market
instruments) to be settled at the end of the period, on which no interest needs
is paid. I.e., let MCt be the nominal marginal costs of producing an extra
unit of output, excluding the additional costs of borrowing, see equation (54).
Then,
Lt,j = ξMCtyt,j
and the value-added of this firm (or, equivalently, end-of-period profits) are
Vt,j = (Pt,j − (1 + ξit)MCt)yt,j (9)
Firms get to re-optimize prices with probability 1 − α, independently of
their past. If they cannot re-optimize prices, they will be adjusted at the
average inflation rate, i.e.
Pt,j = p¯iPt−1,j (10)
When given a chance to re-optimize prices, they will choose it so as to max-
imize discounted value added along the no-optimization-of-prices path2
NPVt,j = E
[ ∞∑
k=0
αkΛt,t+kVt,j
]
(11)
where Λt,t+k is the market price at date t for an extra unit of cash at date
t+ k on the financial markets in part 4 of the period.
2.4 Commercial banks
Banks compete for deposits from households and can borrow from the central
bank. They then compete for giving loans to firms. Banks collect the returns
on their loans in the forth part of the period, and then repay households as
2Note that I assume that value added or profits are taxed at rate τV . Since I hold this
rate constant, maximizing the net present value of before-tax value-added is equivalent
to maximizing the net present value of after-tax value added, which would be the more
appropriate objective.
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well as the central bank. In equilibrium, banks make zero profits. Thus, there
will be a market nominal rate of return it on loans, deposits and central bank
money.
2.5 The central bank
The central bank provides cash Ψt into the economy via providing loans to
the commercial banks at the nominal interest rate it. It may be best to think
of this as open market operations. The interest earnings on this open market
operation constitute seignorage. Additionally, the central bank declares a
fraction ν of the cash injection to be seignorage, not to be taken out of the
system after repayment by the commercial banks. Thus, the government
receives a central bank profit transfer of (ν + it)Ψt in part 4 of the period.
Note that only νΨt, but not the interest earnings on the cash injection (or
even the entire cash injection) constitute an increase in the money supply,
Mt =Mt−1 + νΨt (12)
The parameter ν allows the distinction between a short-run liquidity injection
and a long-run increase in money supply. If ν = 0, liquidity is provided only
temporary, and taken out of the economy after the injection. Seignorage
is then given only by the interest earned on the short-term injection. By
contrast, ν = 1 means that any short-term injection also increases money
supply in the long run.
Recall, that the output gap is defined as the difference between actual
output and the output which would emerge in the absence of sticky prices
and absence of stickiness in wages, i.e. for α = 0 and ω = 1, but keeping
the friction of borrowing from banks. In an economy without sticky prices
and sticky wages and without the need to borrow from banks, real marginal
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costs will be constant. The percent deviation of actual real marginal costs
mct =
MCt
Pt
(13)
from its steady state level can therefore serve as a proxy for the output gap.
I therefore assume that the central bank follows a Taylor rule in setting
interest rates, using this ratio, i.e. that
it = i¯+ ρi,Lit−1 + (1− ρi,L)
(
ζpi(
pit
p¯i
− 1) + ζx(mct
mc
− 1) + ui,t
)
(14)
where
pit =
Pt
Pt−1
(15)
is inflation, where p¯i is the inflation target, i¯ is the steady state nominal rate,
ζpi and ζx are coefficients of the policy rule, and where
ui,t = ρi,uui,t−1 + ²i,t (16)
is a possibly persistent distortion to the Taylor rule, driven by the monetary
policy shock ²i,t.
2.6 The government
The budget constraint of the government at the end of the period is given by
qtBt = Bt−1 + Ptgt − τtWtnt − τV Vt − (ν + it)Ψt (17)
The government does not carry cash from one period to the next. However,
the government is assumed to finance its purchases within the period via a
short-term credit from the central bank. Thus, government spending Ptgt is
akin to a short-term cash injection on the demand side. This is consistent
with the view that the central bank acts as the “checking account” bank to
the government. Note that I do not allow the government to borrow from
the central bank in the long term.
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Define real debt
bt =
Bt
Pt
(18)
real seignorage
ψt =
Ψt
Pt
(19)
real value-added
vt =
Vt
Pt
(20)
as well as real wages
wt =
Wt
Pt
(21)
I assume that the government aims at some steady-state debt-to-GDP
ratio b¯/y¯ as well at some steady state level government-spending-to-GDP
ratio g¯/y¯. Given all other parameters, let τ¯ be the steady state tax rate on
wage income consistent with these targets.
I assume that the government follows the policy rule of adjusting future
tax and spending plans, if the current debt level bt deviates from its target
level b¯,
τt − τ¯ = ζτ (bt−1 − b¯
y¯
− 1) + uτ,t (22)
gt
y¯
= ζg(
bt−1 − b¯
y¯
− 1) + ug,t (23)
(24)
where ζτ ≥ 0 and ζg ≤ 0 such that the dynamics of government debt remains
stable, and where both equations are driven by possibly persistent distortions
uτ,t = ρτuτ,t−1 + ²τ,t (25)
ug,t = ρgug,t−1 + ²g,t (26)
driven by the fiscal tax shock ²τ,t and the fiscal spending shock ²g,t.
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2.7 Labor markets and wage setting
I assume that wages move sluggishly on the aggregate level. A common form
to generate nominal wage sluggishness is to assume Calvo wage stickiness for
wage setters, see Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000). A different literature
has emphasized frictions or sluggishness stemming from bargaining as the
route cause, see Shimer (2005) or Hall (2005), giving directly rise to real
wage sluggishness. The form I use here has been adapted from Blanchard
and Gali (2005) and has been used e.g. in Uhlig (2007).
More specifically, let Wt,f be the wage emerging from the first-order con-
dition of the households maximization problem. I assume that
Wt = ((1− ω)pitWt−1 + ωΥWt,f ) (1 + uw,t) (27)
for some Υ > 1 and a possibly persistent stochastic distortion
uw,t = ρwuw,t−1 + ²w,t (28)
An alternative interpretation of the distortion uw,t is to view it as being
driven by fluctuations in the preference parameter A, manifested in stochastic
fluctuations of the market clearing wage Wt,f . This perspective may be a
reasonable shortcut in order to account for e.g. the fluctuations in female
labor supply.
Assuming moderate-size fluctuations, actual wages will exceed the wage
stemming from the first-order condition, Wt > Wt,f , and thus, labor markets
will be demand constrained. I.e., I assume that households always supply
labor at the going wage. Note that (27) can be rewritten in terms of real
wages as
wt = ((1− ω)wt−1 + ωΥwt,f ) (1 + uw,t) (29)
where wt,f = Wt,f/Pt.
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2.8 Aggregation and market clearing
1. Money market: Post-injection money supply equals end-of-period money
demand, is given by
Mt = Dt +Ht (30)
2. Final goods market:
gt + ct + xt = yt (31)
3. Labor market:
nt =
∫ 1
0
nt,jdj (32)
4. Capital market:
kt−1 =
∫ 1
0
kt−1,jdj (33)
5. Loan market:
Dt−1 +Ψt = Lt =
∫ 1
0
Lt,jdj (34)
2.9 Equilibrium and Solution
An equilibrium is an allocation, policy parameters and prices (including re-
turns and profits) such that
1. the allocation solves the problem of the representative household, given
prices and policy parameters,
2. the allocation solves the firms maximization problems, given prices,
and policy parameters
3. the constraints for the government and the central bank hold,
4. markets clear
18
To solve for the equilibrium, I characterize the first-order conditions, ex-
plicitely solve for the steady state and characterize the dynamics per log-
linearization around the steady state. I then compute the recursive law of
motion solving these log-linearized equations. Details are available in a tech-
nical appendix.
3 Data and estimation.
I assume that ug,t ≡ 0, i.e., I assume that there are no fiscal spending shocks.
This is reasonable in light of the smoothness3 in figures 3.
There are five shocks in the model: I therefore need observations on five
time series to solve for these shocks:
1. pit, inflation. I calculate it using the GDP deflator, since I am using
real GDP in some other measures. A popular alternative is to use the
consumer price index.
2. it, the central bank interest rate or short rate.
3. yt/nt, i.e. labor productivity. For yt, I use real GDP. For nt, I use
employment rather than hours worked. In a boom, more part-time
labor will be hired, but also, more “uncounted” hours are worked by
employees: it may thus be that employment rather than hours is a
more reasonable variable to measure fluctuations in labor input. It was
also the series that was more easily available.
4. ct/yt, the consumption-to-GDP ratio. Cochrane (1994) in particular
has shown that this ratio has predictive power for GDP growth and
3It also appeared to be initially sensible for the invertibility issue discussed in the next
section, when doing an exploration of the model properties with freely chosen parameters:
that issue seemed to disappear with the estimated parameters, though.
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a number of other variables. Theory implies that this statistic indeed
provides key information: so it is included here.
5. bt/yt, the debt-to-GDP ratio.
For the EMU, the data has been obtained from the ECB, and is in use for
the area-wide model. For the US, the data has been obtained from the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. For debt, I have used the series GFDEBTN, i.e.
debt on the federal level.
I have used quarterly data from 1985 to 2005, striking a compromise
between getting a reasonably long time span for data and relying on a rea-
sonably stable monetary policy environment. While EMU only exists since
1999, one might argue that the Bundesbank has effectively played the role
of a European central bank in the time before.
I am comparing the model in its log-linearized version, i.e. in terms of
log-deviations from the steady state, to the data. I therefore take logs of
all variables, and removed the means. The resulting five time series used in
estimation can therefore be seen in figure 4. In particular, I have linearly
detrended labor productivity. If there is a constant time trend in γt, it is
fairly straightforward to correct all equations for it: essentially, this amounts
to a slight correction in the discount rate. If the time trend is stochastic,
the correction would imply a different set of equations, comparing everything
to the current level of productivity. Since I log-linearized the model around
a steady state with constant productivity, the linear detrending method is
therefore more compatible with the theory.
The linearized model has been estimated, using DYNARE. In so doing, I
have fixed a number of parameters, and estimated others. A list is given in
tables 1 and 2.
For the parameters fixed a priori, I have set n¯ = 1, backing out the
preference parameter A, rather than vice versa. In order to capture the
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Figure 4: Data used for estimation
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different importance of banking in Europe versus the US, I have fixed ξ = 0.5
for Europe, and ξ = 0.1 for the US. A good calibration for these numbers
would be sensible: the results here instead should be taken as indicative for
what would happen for reasonable, although perhaps not sufficiently carefully
calibrated values for these parameters. The factor five was chosen to roughly
reflect the approximately fivefold financing of firms through banks (rather
than capital market instruments and stocks) in Europe compared to the US.
I have used 1 for the inverse Frisch elasticity σ of labor supply. All the other
parameters are fairly standard.
For the estimated parameters, I have chosen rather uninformative pri-
ors. For parameters which should sensibly be in the unit interval, I used a
uniform distribution, or, equivalently, a beta distribution with mean 0.5 and
a standard deviation of 1/
√
12 = 0.29. For parameters which ought to be
positive, I have used an inverted gamma distribution with infinite variance.
I have used a normal distribution centered at zero and a standard deviation
of 1 for ζg, which is certainly wide.
4 A, B, C and D’s of VAR’s
When estimating a model with just a subset of variables, the issue of invert-
ibility may be of concern. Invertibility may matter even more for recovering
the sequence of shocks explaining the observations. I use the ABCD frame-
work of Fernandez-Villaverde et al (2007) to investigate the issue: the name
of their paper has inspired the choice of the title for this subsection.
Let xt be the list of log-deviations from steady state for all variables in
the economy, including the exogenous disturbances ui,t etc.. Let yt be a list
of observable variables, and let ²t be the vector of iid shocks, driving the
system. Solving the linearized model with e.g. the methods exposited in
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Parameter US EMU, if different interpretation
γ¯ 1 Productivity
β 0.99 discount factor
θ 0.36 capital share
δ 0.02 depreciation rate
σ 1 inverse Frisch elast.
Φ 0.8 * markup fixed cost
µ 0.5 markup
$ 2 cost of adjustment of capital
Υ 1.1 wage markup
ξ 0.1 0.5 bank financing share
g¯/y¯ 0.15 0.2 gov. spending to GDP
b¯/y¯ 0.62 debt-to-GDP ratio
p¯i 1.033 inflation
τV 0.2 profit or value added tax
Table 1: List of parameters fixed a priori.
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Parameter Distribution mean std.dev. interpretation
η beta 0.5 0.29 cash-in-advance share
ν beta 0.5 0.29 permanent liquidity
α beta 0.5 0.29 Calvo prob. of stickiness
χ beta 0.5 0.29 habit share
ω beta 0.5 0.29 wage sluggishness
ρw beta 0.5 0.29 autocorr. wage disturb.
ργ,L beta 0.5 0.29 autoregr. techn.
ργ,u beta 0.5 0.29 autocorr. techn. disturb.
ρx beta 0.5 0.29 autocorr. inv disturb.
ρi,L beta 0.5 0.29 autoregr. int. rate
ρi,u beta 0.5 0.29 autocorr. int.rate disturb.
ρτ beta 0.5 0.29 autocorr. tax disturb.
ζτ inv.gamma 0.5 ∞ tax rule
ζg normal -0.2 1 spending rule
ζpi inv.gamma 1.5 ∞ Taylor rule: on inflation
ζx inv.gamma 0.5 ∞ Taylor rule: on markup
stderr(²γ) inv.gamma 0.2 ∞ std.err techn.
stderr(²i) inv.gamma 0.2 ∞ std.err int.rate
stderr(²τ ) inv.gamma 0.2 ∞ std.err tax rate
stderr(²x) inv.gamma 0.2 ∞ std.err inv. shock
stderr(²w) inv.gamma 0.2 ∞ std.err wage shock
Table 2: List of estimated parameters
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Uhlig (1999) provides a recursive law of motion
xt = Axt−1 +B²t (35)
yt = Cxt−1 +D²t (36)
Assume that D is square and invertible, and that the eigenvalues of (A −
BD−1C) are strictly less than one in modulus. Fernandez-Villaverde et al
(2007) show that
yt = C
∞∑
j=0
(A−BD−1C)−jyt−j−1 +D²t (37)
is an (infinite-order) vector autoregression for yt, and that D²t are the one-
step ahead forecasts for yt.
Let
yt = C
k∑
j=0
(A−BD−1C)−1yt−j−1 +D²t + ϑk,t (38)
be a finite-order approximation to the infinite-order VAR in (37), defining
the approximation error ϑk,t. Given a recursive law of motion as in (35,36),
and assuming D to be square and invertible, it is always possible to calculate
the finite-order approximation (38). In practice, one would drop ϑk,t from
this equation, hoping that it is small. Equation (38) then provides for a
convenient procedure to recover the residuals ²t driving the data.
But ϑk,t may not be small, either because the eigenvalues of (A−BD−1C)
are not strictly less than one in modulus, or because they are only just below
one, with the coefficients in (37) only gradually dying out with increasing lag
length. The latter is the problem emphasized by Chari, Kehoe and McGrat-
tan (2005).
It may thus be useful to examine how fast the coefficients in (38) die out at
a specific parameterization of the model. Grouping the coefficients together
according to lag length, I do this in figure5 for the coefficient specifications
below for the US and EMU. Note that the VAR coefficients die out quite
fast.
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Figure 5: Coefficients in the derived VAR representation for yt.
5 Results
5.1 Estimates
The results of the estimation are provided in table 4. The results are taken
directly from Dynare, using standard settings. While some of the confidence
intervals are perhaps too tight - most likely pointing to yet insufficient sam-
pling - the estimates all appear to be reasonable.
Taking these estimates at face value, there are some interesting differ-
ences as well similarities in the comparison of the US to EMU. Surprisingly,
according to these estimates, wages actually appear to be more flexible and
less sluggish in the EMU rather than the US, with ω = 0.18 and ρw = 0.88
there as opposed to ω = 0.06 and ρw = 0.686 in the EMU. Less surprisingly,
prices appear to be more sticky in EMU with α = 0.778 than the US with
α = 0.668. Productivity (or, for the US, the productivity disturbance), tax
disturbances and investment-specific disturbances are all essentially random
walks.
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The fraction η of cash required for consumption transactions is about one
third in EMU and about one half in the US. Monetary injections seem to
be temporary in the US, ν = 0.27, but permanent in Europe, ν = 0.981.
Interest rates show a persistence of ρi,L = 0.289 one-third in EMU and about
three quarter in the US: if anything, interest rate choices appear to be more
sluggish in the US. The Taylor rule coefficients are about 1.2 on inflation and
0.2 on markup in the EMU, which is reasonable. They are slightly lower for
inflation and slightly higher on markup for the US.
The feedback coefficients for fiscal policy differ in an interesting way. In
response to a higher debt burden, the US moderately raises taxes, ζτ =
0.18 and cuts spending, ζg = −0.058, while the Europeans actually increase
spending, ζg = 0.079 and finance it by raising taxes even more, ζτ = 0.356.
Monetary policy shocks, tax shocks and wage shocks show considerably
larger standard deviations in the US than in EMU.
As a postscriptum, the estimation results and therefore the conclusions
based on them should be viewed with a considerable degree of caution. Note
that the parameters are estimated rather indirectly: identification is achieved
through their impact on the dynamics of the whole system, rather than some
more direct consequence. It is likely that misspecification of the model can
easily thwart the attempt to draw reasonable inference here: investigating
that issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
Even with the route taken here, it turns out that the model and its estima-
tion appear to be quite sensitive in particular with respect to the parameters
ξ as well as the fiscal policy parameters g¯/y¯, ζτ , ζg. For example, it is fairly
easy to find parameter combinations, where DYNARE delivers nonsensical
results or complains about violations of the Blanchard-Kahn condition for
the prior, while it is still possible to calculate solutions with my “toolkit”:
as an example, take ξ = 1, g¯/y¯ = 0.35, ζτ = 1, ζg = 0, and otherwise taking
prior means for all other variables. For some other parameter settings, one
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Parameter mean conf. interval mean conf. interval
US EMU
η 0.57 [ 0.23, 0.90] 0.38 [ 0.16, 0.60]
ν 0.27 [ 0.00, 0.68] 0.981 [ 0.974, 0.995]
α 0.668 [ 0.667, 0.676 ] 0.778 [ 0.769, 0.793]
χ 0.64 [ 0.64, 0.65 ] 0.35 [ 0.30, 0.42 ]
ω 0.18 [ 0.17, 0.18 ] 0.061 [ 0.055, 0.078]
ρw 0.88 [0.88, 0.89] 0.686 [ 0.682, 0.685 ]
ργ,L 0.00 [ 0.00, 0.00] 0.979 [0.978, 0.980 ]
ργ,u 0.93 [ 0.93, 0.96] 0.266 [ 0.248 0.262 ]
ρx 1 [ 1 , 1 ] 0.962 [ 0.958, 0.964]
ρi,L 0.73 [ 0.73, 0.74 ] 0.289 [ 0.285,0.290 ]
ρi,u 0.24 [ 0.22, 0.24] 0.496 [ 0.495, 0.498]
ρτ 0.99 [0.99, 0.99] 0.985 [0.982, 0.984]
ζτ 0.18 [ 0.18, 0.18] 0.356 [ 0.352, 0.355 ]
ζg -0.058 [ -0.058, -0.058] 0.079 [ 0.078, 0.079 ]
ζpi 1.07 [1.07, 1.07] 1.192 [ 1.192, 1.193]
ζx 0.35 [0.35, 0.35] 0.211 [ 0.210, 0.211 ]
stderr(²γ) 0.26 [0.24, 0.26] 0.30 [ 0.29, 0.33]
stderr(²i) 2.38 [2.38, 2.55] 1.08 [ 1.05, 1.24]
stderr(²τ ) 1.56 [ 1.58, 1.64] 0.52 [0.49, 0.58 ]
stderr(²x) 2.15 [ 2.07, 2.25 ] 1.95 [ 1.81, 2.16]
stderr(²w) 0.84 [ 0.80, 0.87] 0.49 [ 0.45, 0.56]
Table 3: Estimation results
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obtains warnings about badly scaled matrices and difficulties in starting the
Markov chain. It is also not unusual that the posterior maximization proce-
dure encounters a cliff shortly before it declare the maximum to be reached.
This is true in particular for the estimation of the US model, possibly ex-
plaining the unplausibly tight confidence bands for several parameters. The
estimation results can also depend quite substantially on g¯/y¯ and ξ, which
have been fixed a priori. In sum, either the model or the estimation proce-
dure is ill-behaved in certain aspects. Exploring these sensitivities and the
reasons further would be interesting, but beyond the scope of this paper.
5.2 Impulse responses
To understand the properties of the model, I have calculated the impulse
responses to shocks one percent in size, with the estimated parameters set
at the posterior means rounded to two digits. Figure 6 shows the impulse
response of the nominal interest rate. Figure 7 shows the response of output
and figure 8 shows the response of inflation. A technical appendix also shows
the impulse responses of the remaining variables used for estimating the
model, i.e. labor productivity, the consumption-to-output ratio and the debt-
to-output ratio.
In these figures, I have also considered two “intermediate” parameteri-
zations to judge the contribution of two features in particular: the higher
(assumed) requirement for bank lending in the EMU parameterization, and
the parameterization of the labor market with ω and ρw. Starting from the
US parameterization, I have first only changed the parameter ξ from 0.2 to
1. Next I also have changed the parameters for the labor market to the EMU
estimates.
It turns out that the banking requirement ξ matters only for a few key re-
sponses and variables. For example, the response of nominal interest rates as
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well as inflation to investment disturbances moves sizeably, when changing ξ.
The change in labor market parameters matters in particular in the response
of inflation to monetary policy shocks - which becomes less pronounced in
the US, if using EMU labor market parameters - as well as the reaction to
wage disturbances of all three variables.
Note also that the difference in the monetary policy reaction function in
EMU compared to the US shows, if anything, a more pronounced reaction to
shocks one standard deviation in size - which then is counterbalanced by the
fact that these shocks appear to be smaller. The shape and thus the speed
of the reaction looks similar across both regions. I.e., by and large, the EMU
monetary policy reaction function looks like the US monetary policy reaction
function, scaled up a bit, perhaps by a factor of two. This is inconsistent
with the view that monetary policy in EMU is sklerotic or that it is indecisive
decision making by a committee of monetary policy makers in Europe.
5.3 Answering the question
Equipped with these tools, I can finally provide an answer to the question
with which this paper started out. The answer is provided4 graphically in
figure 9. Note that all figures there have been drawn on the same scale
for comparison. This figure decomposes the surprise movements in the US
and the EMU into the five shocks, and adding up their contributions to the
cumulative forecast error, compared to the no-shock prediction in 1998. I.e.,
the sequence of shocks, shown in figure 10, give rise to impulse responses
of the short-term interest rate or central bank interest rate: these impulse
responses are cumulated at each point in time, for all present and past shocks
back to 1998 shown.
4It would be even better to provide standard errors in these graphs, based on the
posterior distribution for the parameters given above.
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Figure 6: Impulse responses of interest rates.
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Figure 7: Impulse responses of interest rates.
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Figure 8: Impulse responses of interest rates.
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Figure 9: Contribution of each shock to the cummulative forecast error,
compared to the no-shock prediction starting in 1996.
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Figure 10: Sequence of shocks.
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It turns out that three main sources of the movements come from tech-
nology shocks, from monetary policy shocks and finally, from wage shocks.
Interestingly, the monetary policy shocks provide a fairly similar pattern for
both Europe and the US. The top right hand plot in figure 9 shows that mon-
etary policy was tighter in both the US and EMU in 2000, but considerably
looser in 2004, than can be explained by all other variables and historical
experience. If one views these shocks as policy mistakes, one would conclude
that pretty much the same mistakes have been made in both regions, and
that, if anything, the Fed seemed to follow the ECB rather than the other
way around.
Surprise movements in productivity provide for a key difference between
the US and EMU. Note that movements in labor productivity in the new
millenium were sharply different in the US and in EMU, as evidenced by
the left figure in the second row of figure 4. Figure 6 shows that monetary
policy reacts to surprise rises in productivity and thus the surprise fall in
marginal costs by lowering interest rates, see the top left panel. The central
bank can afford to do so, since inflation is falling anyhow, as a result, see the
top left panel in figure 8. Together, it then may no longer surprise, that the
productivity movements in this millenium led to a considerable downward
drift of interest rates in the US, but upward pressure in the EMU, see the
top left panel in figure 9.
The main additional difference then arises due to surprise wage move-
ments. In the US, they have contributed to raising interest rates before 2000
and after 2004, with the opposite movements in the EMU, see the bottom
panel in figure 9.
While the reaction function of US and EMU monetary policy to both
wage shocks and productivity shocks differ quantitatively, see figure 6, they
do not differ qualitatively. The differences in the interest rate movements in
figure 9 arises due to different shocks, actually almost moving in oppositive
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direction for both variables.
In sum, it appears that the difference between the two monetary policies
seen in figure 1 is due to both surprises in productivity as well as surprises
in wage demands, moving interest rates in opposite directions in Europe and
the US. , but not due to a more sluggish response in Europe to the same
shocks or to different monetary policy surprises.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
The conclusion from this quantitative exercise appears to be that the dif-
ference between the two monetary policies seen in figure 1 is due to both
surprises in productivity as well as surprises in wage demands, moving in-
terest rates in opposite directions in Europe and the US. , but not due to a
more sluggish response in Europe to the same shocks or to different monetary
policy surprises. If anything, it appears that monetary policy in EMU reacts
more strongly to shocks, when they appear.
But a number of words of caution are in order. First, these conclusions
hinge on a particular choice of shocks propagating in the economy. There is
a tradeoff between missing an important disturbance as explanation versus
adding spurious shocks and thus risking to misinterpret important economic
dynamics as movements in these spurious disturbances instead.
Second, the conclusions hinge on the particular model chosen. Is there
any sense that they are correct across a wide range of models or approaches?
The model may be faulty in a number of crucial features - or improve on these
features compared to other models: how are we to judge this? Acknowledging
misspecification of the theory and seeking robust approaches to answer the
key question may be a way to proceed further, see e.g. Hansen and Sargent
(2001).
Third, while the paper has provided an accounting method for explaining
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the different interest paths in the US and the EMU, it has not asked whether
this difference is, in fact, optimal or what the optimal reaction function
should have been. I.e., it may be the case that US monetary policy has
behaved badly and EMU monetary policy has done the right thing, or the
other way around: the analysis above has not addressed this issue all. The
tools for pursuing this question are provided in e.g. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2004, 2005) or Levin et al (2005). One could even combine the perspective
of optimality with the acknowledgement of misspecification and a desire for
robustness, see e.g. Levin and Williams (2003).
At the end of the day, there appears to be little else than delivering
quantitative answers, based on thoughtfully chosen assumptions. This paper
hopes to make a contribution to that end. Along its novel features it has pro-
vided a possibility for considering traditional lending channels of monetary
policy alongside the sticky-price perspective pursued by the more recent new
Keynesian literature. To that end a hybrid New Keynesian cash in advance
model has been provided, estimated and used to quantitatively answer the
question at hand.
Some progress has been made. But much more needs to be done.
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Technical Appendix
A Analysis
A.1 First-order conditions
A.1.1 Households
Households solve
max
ct,bt,dt,ht
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
log(ct − χct−1)− An1+σt
)]
s.t. ηct =
ht−1
pit
(39)
ht + dt + qtbt + (1− η)ct + xt (40)
= (1− τt)wtnt + 1 + it
pit
dt−1 + rtkt−1 + (1− τV )vt + bt−1
pit
kt =
(
1− δ + ϕ
(
(1 + ux,t)
xt
kt−1
))
kt−1 (41)
Let %t be the Lagrange multiplier on the first constraint (39), λt on the second
constraint (40) and ςt the Lagrange multiplier on the third constraint (41).
Note that
Λt =
λt
Pt
(42)
would therefore be the Lagrange multiplier on the second constraint written
in nominal terms. Therefore,
Λt,t+k = β
kΛt+k
Λt
=
λt+kPt
λtPt+k
(43)
The first-order conditions are
∂L
∂ct
: η%t + (1− η)λt = 1
ct − χct−1 − βχEt
[
1
ct+1 − χct
]
(44)
∂L
∂ht
: λt = βEt[
%t+1
pit+1
] (45)
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∂L
∂dt
: λt = βEt
[
λt+1
1 + it+1
pit+1
]
(46)
∂L
∂bt
: λtqt = βEt
[
λt+1
pit+1
]
(47)
∂L
∂xt
: λt = (1 + ux,t)ϕ
′
(
(1 + ux,t)
xt
kt−1
)
ςt (48)
∂L
∂kt
: ςt = βEt [λt+1rt+1] (49)
+βEt
[
ςt+1
(
1− δ + ϕ
(
(1 + ux,t+1)
xt+1
kt
))]
−βEt
[
ςt+1
(
(1 + ux,t+1)ϕ
′
(
(1 + ux,t+1)
xt+1
kt
)
xt+1
kt
)]
Also note that the first-order condition with respect to labor determines
the target real wage wt,f ,
∂L
∂nt
: λt(1− τt)wt,f = (1 + σ)Anσt (50)
A.1.2 Final good firms
Maximizing profits
Ptyt −
∫ 1
0
Pt,jyt,jdj
subject to the production function (6) results in the demand function
yt,j =
(
Pt
Pt,j
) 1+µ
µ
yt (51)
and the price aggregation
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
P
−1/µ
t,j dj
)−µ
(52)
=
(
(1− α) (P ∗t )−1/µ + α (p¯iPt−1)−1/µ
)−µ
(53)
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A.1.3 Intermediate good firms
Cost minimization leads to the nominal marginal costs of producing an extra
unit of output,
MCt = Ptθ
−θ(1− θ)θ−1γ−1t rθtw1−θt (54)
and therefore to the real marginal costs
mct = θ
−θ(1− θ)θ−1γ−1t rθtw1−θt , (55)
excluding the costs of borrowing from bank.
Cost minimization also implies that
rtkt,j = θmctγtk
θ
t,jn
1−θ
t,j (56)
wtnt,j = (1− θ)mctγtkθt,jn1−θt,j (57)
Therefore the capital-labor ratio kt,j/nt,j is the same across all firms, and
equal to the aggregate ratio kt−1/nt. Aggregating (56) and (57) across all
firms yields
rtkt−1 = θmctγtkθt−1n
1−θ
t
wtnt = (1− θ)mctγtkθt−1n1−θt (58)
Note that (58) follows from (58) with (55) or vice versa. I will therefore drop
(58) when collecting all equations below. Alternatively, observe that (58)
and (55) imply the more intuitive equation
1
θ
rtkt−1 =
1
1− θwtnt (59)
To calculate the aggregate production function, observe that
γtk
θ
t−1n
1−θ
t =
∫ 1
0
(yt,j + Φ)dj
=
∫ 1
0
(
Pt
Pt,j
) 1+µ
µ
dj
 yt + Φ
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so that
yt =
(
St
Pt
) 1+µ
µ (
γtk
θ
t−1n
1−θ
t − Φ
)
(60)
where
St =
(∫ 1
0
P
− 1+µ
µ
t,j dj
)− µ
1+µ
(61)
=
(
(1− α) (P ∗t )−
1+µ
µ + α (p¯iSt−1)
− 1+µ
µ
)− µ
1+µ
and where (St/Pt)
1+µ
µ can be thought of as a correction of the Solow residual
due to sticky prices. This correction is known to disappear in a first-order
log-linear approximation, see also (124) below, but it may be relevant in
higher-order approximations.
When a firm can re-optimize its price P ∗t = Pt,j, it seeks to maximize the
objective (11), taking into account the dependence of demand on its chosen
price in future dates, if prices cannot be re-optimized, and taking into account
the costs of borrowing from banks,
yt(P
∗
t−k) =
(
Pt
p¯ikP ∗t−k
) 1+µ
µ
yt (62)
This problem can be rewritten as
max
P ∗t
E
[ ∞∑
k=0
αkΛt,t+kyt+k(P
∗
t ) (P
∗
t − Pt+k(1 + ξit+k)mct+k)
]
(63)
The first-order condition becomes - as usual (or with some calculation) -
P ∗t Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
αkΛt,t+kp¯i
kyt+k(P
∗
t )
]
= (1 + µ)Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
αkΛt,t+kyt+k(P
∗
t )Pt+k(1 + ξit+k)mct+k
]
(64)
which essentially says that P ∗ is a markup of µ over nominal marginal costs
inclusive of the costs of borrowing,
Pt+k(1 + ξit+k)mct+k,
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appropriately discounted.
Aggregating (9) across all firms delivers
vt = yt − (1 + ξit)mctγtkθt−1n1−θt (65)
A.2 Banks
Note that the required loan quantity per intermediate good firms is
Lt,j = ξMCt(yt,j + Φ) (66)
Aggregating, and equalizing to available funds yields in real terms
dt−1
pit
+ ψt = ξmctγtk
θ
t−1n
1−θ
t (67)
which I shall use instead of (34).
A.3 Parameters
The fundamental parameters are
A, β, χ, σ, θ, δ,Φ, µ, γ¯, ργ,L, ργ,u, ρx, $
and the variance of the technology shock and investment-specific shock. The
parameters for prices, wages and credit markets are
Υ, α, ω, ξ, ρw, η
and the variance of the wage shock. The policy parameters are
g¯, b¯, p¯i, ν, τV
as well as the feedback coefficients
ζτ , ζg, ζpi, ζx, ρi,L, ρi,u, ρτ , ρg
and variances of the policy shocks.
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A.4 Collecting the equations
The equations characterizing the equilibrium are (HH: “household”, “FG”:
final good firms, “IG”: intermediate good firms, ”CB”: central bank, ”GOV”:
government, ”MC”: labor market and market clearing):
HH: 0 = −ηct + ht−1
pit
(68)
HH: 0 = −ht − dt − qtbt − (1− η)ct − xt
+(1− τt)wtnt + rtkt−1 + 1 + it
pit
dt−1 + (1− τV )vt + bt−1
pit
(69)
HH: 0 = −kt +
(
1− δ + ϕ
(
xt
kt−1
))
kt−1 (70)
HH: 0 = −η%t − (1− η)λt + 1
ct − χct−1 − βχEt
[
1
ct+1 − χct
]
(71)
HH: 0 = −λt + βEt[%t+1
pit+1
] (72)
HH: 0 = −λt + βEt
[
λt+1
1 + it+1
pit+1
]
(73)
HH: 0 = −λtqt + βEt
[
λt+1
pit+1
]
(74)
HH: 0 = −λt + (1 + ux,t)ϕ′
(
(1 + ux,t)
xt
kt−1
)
ςt (75)
HH: 0 = −ςt + βEt [λt+1rt+1] (76)
+βEt
[
ςt+1
(
1− δ + ϕ
(
(1 + ux,t+1)
xt+1
kt
))]
−βEt
[
ςt+1
(
(1 + ux,t+1)ϕ
′
(
(1 + ux,t+1)
xt+1
kt
)
xt+1
kt
)]
HH: 0 = −λt(1− τt)wt,f + (1 + σ)Anσt (77)
FG: 0 = −yt(P ∗t−k) +
(
Pt
p¯ikP ∗t−k
) 1+µ
µ
yt (78)
FG: 0 = −Pt +
(
(1− α) (P ∗t )−1/µ + α (p¯iPt−1)−1/µ
)−µ
(79)
IG: 0 = −St +
(
(1− α) (P ∗t )−
1+µ
µ + α (p¯iSt−1)
− 1+µ
µ
)− µ
1+µ
(80)
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IG: 0 = −yt +
(
St
Pt
) 1+µ
µ (
γtk
θ
t−1n
1−θ
t − Φ
)
(81)
IG: 0 = −mct + θ−θ(1− θ)θ−1γ−1t rθtw1−θt (82)
IG: 0 = −rtkt−1 + θmctγtkθt−1n1−θt (83)
IG: 0 = −P ∗t Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(αβ)k
λt+kPt
λtPt+k
p¯ikyt+k(P
∗
t )
]
+
(1 + µ)Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(αβ)k
λt+kPt
λtPt+k
yt+k(P
∗
t )Pt+k(1 + ξit+k)mct+k
]
(84)
IG: 0 = vt − yt + (1 + ξit)mctγtkθt−1n1−θt (85)
CB: 0 = −it + i¯+ ρi,Lit−1 (86)
+(1− ρi,L)
(
ζpi(
pit
p¯i
− 1) + ζx(mct
mc
− 1) + ui,t
)
CB: 0 = −mt + mt−1
pit
+ νψt (87)
GOV: 0 = −qtbt + bt−1
pit
+ gt − τtwtnt − τV vt − (ν + it)ψt (88)
GOV: 0 = −τt + τ¯ + ζτ (bt−1 − b¯
y¯
− 1) + uτ,t (89)
GOV: 0 = −gt
y¯
+ ζg(
bt−1 − b¯
b¯
− 1) + ug,t (90)
MC: 0 = −wt + ((1− ω)wt−1 + ωΥwt,f )(1 + uw,t) (91)
MC: 0 = −mt + dt + ht (92)
MC: 0 = −yt + gt + ct + xt (93)
MC: 0 = −dt−1
pit
− ψt + ξmctγtkθt−1n1−θt (94)
MC: 0 = −pit + Pt
Pt−1
(95)
together with the specification for the exogenous processes
techn.: γˆt = ργ,Lγˆt−1 + ²γ,t (96)
mon.pol: ui,t = ρi,uui,t−1 + ²i,t (97)
taxes: uτ,t = ρτuτ,t−1 + ²τ,t (98)
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gov.spend.: ug,t = ρgug,t−1 + ²g,t (99)
investment: ux,t = ρxux,t−1 + ²x,t (100)
wages: uw,t = ρwuw,t−1 + ²w,t (101)
The equations above determine the quantities
bt, ct, gt, nt, vt, yt,mct, kt, xt, rt
the demand function
yt(P
∗
t−k),
real money balances
dt, ht,mt, ψt,
multipliers
%t, λt, ςt
prices and tax rate
it, Pt, P
∗
t , qt, St, wt, wt,f , pit, τt
as well as the exogenous processes
γt, ui,t, uτ,t, ug,t, ux,t, uw,t
Note that these are 34 equations for 33 variables. One may drop either the
household budget constraint, the government budget constraint or one of the
market clearing conditions, due to Walras’ law.
A.5 Steady state
A.5.1 Household
To calculate the steady state, and since my focus is not on a steady state
comparison across various parameters, I assume a value for n¯ and instead
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back out the compatible preference parameter A. The capital accumulation
equation (70) implies
x¯ = δk¯ (102)
The first-order conditions (72) and (75) of the households imply
%¯ =
p¯i
β
λ¯ (103)
ς¯ = λ¯ (104)
For the rental rate of capital, the first-order condition (76) implies
r¯ =
1
β
− 1 + δ (105)
The first-order conditions (73) and (74) imply
1 + i¯ =
1
q¯
=
p¯i
β
(106)
A.5.2 Firms
We shall assume that the parameters imply v¯ > 0. Equations (79), (80) and
(95) deliver
P¯ ∗t = S¯t = P¯t = p¯iP¯t−1
With equation (78),
y(P¯ ∗t−k) = y¯
The markup equation (84) for the intermediate good implies
mc =
1
(1 + µ)(1 + ξi¯)
(107)
This and equation (83) imply
rk¯ = θmcγ¯k¯θn¯1−θ
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or
k¯ =
(
θmcγ¯
r¯
) 1
1−θ
n¯ (108)
From this and (82) or, equivalently, (58), obtain
w¯ = (1− θ)mcγ¯
(
k¯
n¯
)θ
= (1− θ)θ θ1−θ (mcγ¯) 11−θ r¯ −θ1−θ (109)
With this as well as equations (81,93,71,91,85)
y¯ = γ¯k¯θn¯1−θ − Φ (110)
c¯ = y¯ − g¯ − δk¯ (111)
λ¯ =
(
η
p¯i
β
+ 1− η
)−1
1− βχ
1− χ
1
c¯
(112)
w¯f = w¯/Υ (113)
v¯ = y¯ − (1 + ξi¯)mcγ¯k¯θn¯1−θ (114)
=
µ
1 + µ
γ¯k¯θn¯1−θ − Φ (115)
= y¯ − 1
1 + µ
(y¯ + Φ) (116)
which now allows to solve for the steady state values of the Lagrange multi-
pliers in (103).
A.6 Monetary quantities
Cash demand is given by (68) or
h¯ = ηp¯ic¯ (117)
To calculate the other monetary quantities, combine the three steady state
relationships of (87,92,94),
νψ¯ = m¯
(
1− 1
p¯i
)
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m¯ = d¯+ h¯
ξmc(y¯ − Φ) = d¯
p¯i
+ ψ¯
to obtain
m¯ =
p¯iν
p¯i + ν − 1
(
ξmc(y¯ − Φ) + h¯
p¯i
)
(118)
ψ¯ =
p¯i − 1
p¯iν
m¯ (119)
d¯ = m¯− h¯ (120)
Note that the fraction appearing in the equation for m¯ equals 1, if either
p¯i = 1 or ν = 1. For technical reasons, one must set ν 6= 0. Note that p¯i = 1
implies ψ¯ = 0.
A.6.1 Remaining equations
The steady state government budget constraint (88)
τ¯ w¯n¯ =
1− β
p¯i
b¯+ g¯ − τV v¯ − (ν + i¯)ψ¯ (121)
can be solved for the steady state level of taxes τ¯ . With this and (77),
calculate the preference parameter A per
A =
λ¯(1− τ¯)
1 + σ
n¯−σw¯f (122)
Note finally that (96) to (99) deliver
z¯ = a¯ = f¯τ = f¯g = 0
A.7 Log-linearization
Let hat on variables denote the logarithmic deviation from steady state val-
ues, e.g. cˆt = log(ct)− log(c¯). For nominal quantities, in particular prices, I
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use likewise e.g. Pˆt = log(Pt)− log(P¯t), where I note that P¯t = p¯ikP¯0, starting
from some initial level P¯0. I make the following exceptions for the notation,
so as to allow zero values in steady state or to obtain meaningful quantities:
rt = r¯ + rˆt
it = i¯+ iˆt
τt = τ¯ + τˆt
gt = g¯ + gˆty¯
bt = b¯+ bˆty¯
ψt = ψ¯ + m¯ ψˆt
Hence, rˆt, τˆt and iˆt are in percent, gˆt and bˆt are in percent of steady-state
output and ψˆt is in percent of the steady state money supply. Most equa-
tions can be log-linearized in a straight-forward manner, but some equations
require a bit more thought. They are explained now.
A.7.1 Pricing decisions
The following derivation is standard in the literature on New Keynesian
models and is replicated here for completeness.
Equations (79) and (80) log-linearize to
Pˆt = (1− α)Pˆ ∗t + αPˆt−1 (123)
Sˆt = (1− α)Pˆ ∗t + αSˆt−1
and thus
Sˆt = Pˆt (124)
This substantiates the claim that the correction to the Solow residual in (60)
vanishes in a first-order approximation.
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The first-order condition (84) of the intermediate good firms log-linearizes
to
Pˆ ∗t = (1− αβ)Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(αβ)k
(
ξ
1 + ξi¯
iˆt+k + m̂ct+k + Pˆt+k
)]
(125)
A rather ”pedestrian” but fail-safe way to see this is to indeed replace all
variables, say xt+k with their loglinearized counterpart x¯(1 + xˆt+k), drop all
products of hat-variables as “higher order” (or better, do not write them
down - there are many). Simplify the constants, employing equation (107).
A slightly more sophisticed approach is to immediately loglinearize products,
say xtytzt to x¯y¯z¯(1 + xˆt + yˆt + zˆt).
The equation above can be rewritten as
Pˆ ∗t = (1− αβ)
(
ξ
1 + ξi¯
iˆt + m̂ct + Pˆt
)
+ αβEt[Pˆ
∗
t+1] (126)
From equation (123), substitute Pˆ ∗t and Pˆ
∗
t+1 per
Pˆ ∗t =
1
1− α
(
Pˆt − αPˆt−1
)
.
Combine terms to obtain the New Keynesian Phillips curve
pˆit = βEt [pˆit+1] + κ
(
ξ
1 + ξi¯
iˆt + m̂ct
)
(127)
where
κ =
(1− α)(1− αβ)
α
(128)
One may view the driving term
ξ
1 + ξi¯
iˆt + m̂ct
either as reflecting marginal costs inclusive of the costs of borrowing or as a
correction to net marginal cost by an interest rate cost channel, as emphasized
by Christiano et al (2003).
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A.7.2 Collecting log-linearized equations without expectations
We shall drop the budget constraint of the household - appealing to Walras’
law - as well as equations from pricing decisions and demand, which are no
longer needed. All remaining equations without expectations are, in log-
linearized form:
HH: 0 = −cˆt + hˆt−1 − pˆit (129)
HH: 0 = −kˆt + δxˆt + (1− δ)kˆt−1 + δux,t (130)
HH: 0 = −ςˆt + λˆt (131)
+
1
$
(
xˆt − kˆt−1
)
−
(
1− 1
$
)
ux,t
HH: 0 = −λˆt + τˆt
1− τ¯ − wˆt,f + σnˆt (132)
IG: 0 = − y¯
y¯ + Φ
yˆt + γˆt + θkˆt−1 + (1− θ)nˆt (133)
IG: 0 = −m̂ct + θ rˆt
r¯
+ (1− θ)wˆt − γˆt (134)
IG: 0 = − rˆt
r¯
+ m̂ct + γt + (1− θ)
(
nˆt − kˆt−1
)
(135)
IG: 0 =
v¯
y¯ − v¯ vˆt −
y¯
y¯ − v¯ yˆt +
ξ
1 + ξi¯
iˆt (136)
+m̂ct + γˆt + θkˆt−1 + (1− θ)nt
CB: 0 = −iˆt + ρi,Liˆt−1 + (1− ρi,L) (ζpipˆit + ζxm̂ct + ui,t) (137)
CB: 0 = −mˆt + 1
p¯i
(mˆt−1 − pˆit) + νψˆt (138)
GOV: 0 = −q¯(b¯qˆt + y¯bˆt) + 1
p¯i
(y¯bˆt−1 − b¯pˆit) + y¯gˆt (139)
−w¯n¯τˆt − τ¯ w¯n¯(wˆt + nˆt)− τV v¯vˆt − (ν + i¯)m¯ψˆt − ψ¯ iˆt
GOV: 0 = −τˆt + ζτ bˆt−1 + uτ,t (140)
GOV: 0 = −gˆt + ζg bˆt−1 + ug,t (141)
MC: 0 = −wˆt + (1− ω)wˆt−1 + ωwˆt,f + uw,t (142)
MC: 0 = −m¯mˆt + d¯dˆt + h¯hˆt (143)
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MC: 0 = −y¯yˆt + y¯gˆt + c¯cˆt + x¯xˆt (144)
MC: 0 =
d¯
d¯+ p¯iψ¯
(dˆt−1 − pˆit) + p¯im¯
d¯+ p¯iψ¯
ψˆt (145)
+m̂ct + γˆt + θkˆt−1 + (1− θ)nˆt
together with the specification for the exogenous processes
techn.: γˆt = ργ,Lγˆt−1 + uγ,t (146)
uγ,t = ργ,uuγ,t−1 + ²γ,t (147)
mon.pol: ui,t = ρi,uui,t−1 + ²i,t (148)
taxes: uτ,t = ρτuτ,t−1 + ²τ,t (149)
gov.spend.: ug,t = ρgug,t−1 + ²g,t (150)
investment: ux,t = ρxux,t−1 + ²x,t (151)
wages: uw,t = ρwuw,t−1 + ²w,t (152)
A.7.3 Collecting loglinearized equations with expectations
All equations with expectations in log-linearized form are:
HH: 0 = −(1− βχ)(1− χ)
η p¯i
β
+ 1− η
(
η
p¯i
β
%ˆt + (1− η)λˆt
)
(153)
+χcˆt−1 − (1 + βχ2)cˆt + βχEt[cˆt+1]
HH: 0 = −λˆt + Et[%ˆt+1 − pˆit+1] (154)
HH: 0 = −λˆt + Et
[
λˆt+1 +
iˆt+1
1 + i¯
− pˆit+1
]
(155)
HH: 0 = −λˆt − qˆt + Et
[
λˆt+1 − pˆit+1
]
(156)
HH: 0 = −ςˆt + βEt
[
r¯λˆt+1 + rˆt+1
]
(157)
+βEt
[
(1− δ)ςˆt+1 + δ
$
(
xˆt+1 − kˆt + ux,t+1
)]
FG, IG: 0 = −pˆit + βEt [pˆit+1] + κ
(
ξ
1 + ξi¯
iˆt + m̂ct
)
(158)
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These equations and the equations without expectations determine the evo-
lution of the log-deviations for the quantities
bˆt, cˆt, gˆt, nˆt, vˆt, yˆt, m̂ct, kˆt, xˆt, rˆt
real money balances
dˆt, hˆt, mˆt, ψˆt,
multipliers
%ˆt, λˆt, ςˆt
prices and tax rate
iˆt, qˆt, wˆt, wˆt,f , pˆit, τˆt
Note that there are 23 equations for 23 variables, plus the equations for the
exogenous processes.
Note that qt is the inverse of the one-period risk free return Rt,f from
period t to t+ 1. Hence
Rˆt,f = −qˆt
Note that generally iˆt 6= Rˆt−1,f , since iˆt can react to shocks within period t.
Define
rˆ∗t = rˆt +
1
$
(
xˆt − kˆt−1
)
−
(
1− δ − 1
$
)
ux,t
− 1
β$
(
xˆt−1 − kˆt−2
)
+
1
β
(
1− 1
$
)
ux,t−1 (159)
One may interpret this as the log-deviation of the return to capital, taking
into account the cost of adjustment and the additional discounting due to
the extra period of being able to spend the rental rate on consumption. With
this definition and the help of equation (131), one can rewrite (157) as
0 = −λˆt + η(λˆt − %ˆt)
+Et
[
λt+1 + βη(1− δ)
(
%ˆt+1 − λˆt+1
)
+ βrˆ∗t+1
]
(160)
which may be a more intuitive or familiar expression.
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B Figures
Shown here are the impulse responses of the three variables used for estimat-
ing the model, not shown in the body of the paper.
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